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3INTRODUCTION
1.1 Co-managed isheries: a topical issue for the SRFC area 
☞ Current interest in isheries co-management is irst of all a relection of the failure of conventional isheries mana-
gement against a background of declining income from ishing and increasing conlicts over the exploitation of re-
sources. Already in the nineties, a global study on the transition towards sustainable ishing based on twenty ive case
studies emphasised the success of isheries co-management (OECD, 1997).
Governments and development agencies have promoted
numerous isheries co-management programmes from
the end of the 1990s. In the developing countries, which
include the countries within the area of the Sub-Regional
Fisheries Commission (SRFC), most co-management pro-
visions were introduced at the initiative of the donors and
implemented by the international or local NGOs. The most
visible part of these co-management programmes is the
building of local organisations of ishers and other stake-
holders, and changes to the legal, institutional and admi-
nistrative framework, as co-management is included in
numerous isheries codes or strategic plans of the coun-
tries in the region. 
Promotion of co-management went hand in hand with the
decentralisation of development aid, in the SRFC coun-
tries, as in all the developing countries recipients of in-
ternational aid. To the conventional centralised forms of
development aid distribution through governmental or
quasi-governmental bodies, the donors sought to substi-
tute decentralised forms achieved through promoting co-
management. 
The reshaping of the institutions, a prerequisite for for-
mulating and implementing co-management, was and re-
mains shackled, especially in developing countries, by
incomplete decentralisation and the reticence of the
States to grant local authorities their own iscal resources
(Féral, 2007; Cazalet, 2007). Most of the time, therefore,
we have an administration with limited human and i-
nancial resources on the one hand, and local authorities
not assigned the necessary resources to develop coope-
rative of producers or grassroots organisations, on the
other. 
On a transnational or transboundary scale, co-manage-
ment is justiied by the large volume of shared stocks and
the amplitude of the migratory lows of ishing resources
and ishers, particularly within the SRFC area. Several
projects have been developed on these dimensions over
the past few years in the SRFC countries, including, for
example, the project on “Regional policies on sustainable
isheries of small pelagic ish stocks in Northwest Africa”
(SRFC, 2007a), the “Support project to the Management of
Small-scale Transboundary Fishing” (PARTAGE), the com-
ponent relative to regional processes and frameworks for
understanding and dealing with the priority transboun-
dary problems of the Canaries Current Large Marine Eco-
system protection project. 
However, co-management has been widely used to justify
participatory programmes which, in terms of isheries
management, do not correspond closely enough to the
principal stakes and have not acted on the necessary le-
vers for better management. The players concerned are
therefore led to ponder several questions including; the
contents of co-management in the face of certain abuses
relative to the use of the term; how a management system
evolves towards co-management; and the scales of co-ma-
nagement and their interactions (from local to trans-
boundary). In the light of this situation, an overview of
the literature on isheries co-management was conside-
red a useful tool to have in 2013, to see what lessons can
be learnt.
4☞ At the same time, there has been renewed interest in traditional systems of isheries co-management: the ishers'
corporations (prud’homies) in the French Mediterranean, the Lofoten islands isheries, the Cofradias in Catalonia, the
Van Chai system in Vietnam, the Panchayat village system from Andhra Pradesh. Some of these older systems are only
on the fringes of co-management proper, which evidences the wide spectrum covered by co-management in the ishing
literature. 
1.2 An international analysis around key issues in isheries co-management  
This state-of-the-art on isheries co-management was
produced using a speciic approach combining an in-
depth analysis of the literature, illustrated by the boxes,
and the leveraging of co-management experiences in dif-
ferent countries. To this end, skilled researchers and
consultants from a wide range of backgrounds were
brought together, who, having monitored the processes,
countries and stakeholders concerned over long periods
of time, capitalised on their critical and operational pers-
pective to draw the lessons that can be useful to the SRFC
countries. These international examples are presented in
the technical report through a dozen experience sheets il-
lustrating different types of co-management, the place of
co-management in the whole set of functions associated
with isheries management, the different scales of co-ma-
nagement (local, national, transboundary) in Africa
(Benin, Burkina-Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mauri-
tania and Senegal), in Asia (Indonesia, Japan, Thailand)
Canada and France. Collective, inter-disciplinary work,
drawing on knowledge of the SRFC zone, made it possi-
ble to highlight certain lessons, but also to formulate
points for consideration which could be used as recom-
mendations adapted to isheries co-management in the
region covered by the SRFC.
This work was coordinated by BRLi, and carried out by
experts and researchers from BRLi, Armeris and IRD,
backed by experts from the SRFC and numerous interna-
tional contributions. Three main documents were produ-
ced: 
■ a technical report presenting the state of the art in i-
sheries co-management;
■ this “Synthesis report”, which is a synthesis of the
“technical report”,;
■ a ten-page summary containing the principal conclu-
sions of the study.
The irst part of this report is devoted to the deinition
and classiication of co-management on its various scales,
then to the development and adaptation of co-manage-
ment. Part two deals with drivers of co-management, the
costs and beneits, tools for assessing co-management po-
tential, key success factors and major hurdles, the princi-
pal conditionalities governing co-management as part of
the management of isheries (decision-making cycles and
processes, sharing of functions, design and development,
implementation, technical measures, transboundary and
transnational co-management, integration of co-managed
isheries and Marine Protected Areas, co-management ap-
plied to artiicial reefs and ish-aggregating devices). The
third and inal part draws lessons from the dozen or so
international experiences that have been subject to in-
depth analysis (cf. technical report).
This document will serve as a foundation for a regional
symposium on isheries co-management to be organised
by the SRFC in 2013, to enable a comparison of perspec-
tives, enhance the discussions of the institutions and
concerned stakeholders, determine the major challenges
for the States in terms of co-management and the sustai-
nable management of the region's ishing resources. One
of the speciic challenges will be to leverage this work to
enhance coordination between local, national and regio-
nal governance.
☞ Several major questions related to the co-management of isheries are broached in this study:
■ What are the terms of reference that would allow adequate intervention of each stakeholder in a co-management
system, at the level of the different phases and various scales (local, national, transnational)?
■ What is the relative importance of the social, economic, institutional and legal aspects of co-management, respectively?
■ What are the key factors for success or failure of isheries co-management?
■ What are the main components of conditionality for co-management in terms of framing, capacity building,
data and tools? 
■ Are the costs of co-management higher or lower than other, more centrally-managed systems?
■ What lessons drawn from international experience can be applied to the SRFC region?
51.3 The isheries co-management experiences of more than 30 countries leveraged in the study
Fisheries co-management experiences shown as inserts in the report
Legend
* Other countries and co-management experiences mentioned in the study :
   Co-Management and ITQ, FADs, MPAs, transboundary management, technical measures, etc.)
Co-Management at local level
Co-Management at national level
Co-Management at the transnational level
Map 1 Map of the co-management experiences considered in the study
61.4 An analysis integrating the regional context of the SRFC
For a clearer understanding of the actions to be underta-
ken at the level of the SRFC region, the analysis of the li-
terature and selected examples of co-management took
into account the principal characteristics of this region,
that is to say:
■ A isheries sector that is critical for society and the eco-
nomy, characterised by the coexistence of local and re-
gional artisan isheries (often with a system of free
access) and industrial isheries (predominantly foreign),
where the stakes are major in terms of food security, di-
rect and indirect jobs, added value and exports.
■ Relatively ineffective governance due to the inadequacy
of the conventional approach to isheries management, a
lack of inancial stability and sustainability, incomplete
decentralisation, the weakness of State services and a
fragmented civil society. These weaknesses hamper the
regulation of access to resources for an oversized ishing
capacity.
■ An environment that is highly productive but under-
going constant deterioration: the SRFC region comprises
one of the four major upwelling zones on the planet, as
well as an area covered in estuaries and mangroves,
which explain the extraordinarily rich productivity (igure
1). However, studies of the Large Marine Ecosystems
(LME) conirm the steady and continuous depletion of i-
sheries stocks on a regional scale, some of which are ove-
rexploited.
■ Fisheries resources that are varied, and migrations: the
region comprises intermediate populations of temperate
species and with tropical afinities. Certain stocks of pe-
lagic ish have very marked migratory behaviour, which
explains the seasonal movements of certain ishing com-
munities, on both a national and transnational level. The
amplitude and plurality of migration lows makes ishe-
ries management more complex.
(Source : PRCM, 2011 ;
with the UICN authorization)
Map 2 The area and ecological zones covered by the SRFC and its seven member countries 
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7DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION
AND ADAPTATION OF CO-MANAGEMENT 
2.1 Deinition and classiication of co-management
☞ Fisheries co-management can be deined as the negotiated sharing of responsibilities between government agencies
and groups of users or stakeholders, on condition that it induces:
■ Negotiation and approval of management decisions by the communities or ishers' organisations, government
agencies and other stakeholders,
■ A set of arrangements deining responsibilities and decision-making powers enshrined in a formal agreement.
The idea of isheries co-management emerged after that
of development (aménagement) or management and
prior to that of governance (Weigel, 2011). Starting from
the end of the 1980s, the notion of co-management began
to develop, analysis frameworks were proposed and ar-
rangements discussed (Kearney, 1984; Jentoft, 1989; Pin-
kerton, 1989; Acheson, 1989, Feeny et al, 1990; Oakerson,
1992).
Co-management involves different players and the deve-
lopment of arrangements enabling their interaction; co-
management is above all a process framed by
arrangements, the success of which depends on the va-
rious aspects of conditionality described below (cf. sec-
tion 3.5). 
Fishermen and operators
throughout the value chain
(associations, ship-owners, ishmongers,
factories, etc.)
Civil Society
(NGOs, villagers, local decision makers, etc.)
Research
(Universities, Institutes, biologists,
socio-economists, etc.)
Administration
(ministries, agencies, national,
regional, local, etc.)
Figure 1 The main partners and key players in isheries co-management
(according to Alexis Fossi and Staples and Funge-Smith, 2009)
8The different types of co-management refer to the diffe-
rent degrees of power sharing recognised in government
agencies and users' groups or other stakeholders. Co-ma-
nagement therefore covers a broad spectrum from co-ma-
nagement leaning towards centralised government-based
☞ The broad spectrum of types of co-management explains why there are seven main types of co-management pro-
moted in the literature (McCay, 1993; Berkes 1994; Sen and Raakjaer Nielsen, 1996; Raakjaer Nielsen et al. 2002):
■ instructive co-management is characterised by a minimum of exchanges between user groups and the government
agencies which impose decisions and inform the groups of planned decisions through dialogue facilitations
■ consultative co-management describes a situation where the government, while reserving large areas for consensus,
remains the decision-maker even though user groups have been involved in the process
■ cooperative co-management describes the situation where government and user groups treat each other as equal.
A small number of shared stocks is managed under this type of co-management
■ advisory co-management implies that the user groups advise the government on the decisions to be taken, and the
government takes this into account or approves the decisions
■ informative co-management involves delegation of the government's power to the user groups who nonetheless have
the duty and responsibility of informing the government of the decisions they make
■ instrumental co-management describes a situation where the user groups are only involved in implementing the
measures decided upon by the government, which avoids institutional reform 
■ empowerment co-management places the government and users groups on the same footing both for deining the
management objectives and identifying the knowledge required for decision-making. This type of co-management
is a learning process for all the parties involved.
management to co-management leaning towards com-
munity-based management, via simple cooperative ma-
nagement (Mac Goddwin, 1992; Allison and Ellis, 2001;
Allison and Horremans, 2006) (ig.2) 
Co-management
Self-managementHierarchical
management
Community based
management
Government based
management
Information
 Consultation
  Cooperation
   Communication
    Information exchange
     Support - Advise
      Coordinated action
       Partnership
Figure 2 The co-management spectrum: from government-based to community-based management
(according to Berkes et al, 2001)
92.2 The development and adaptation of co-management 
One type of co-management may evolve over time, with
the introduction of new stakeholders, for example, which
changes the respective roles of the players involved. How
a type of co-management evolves can be represented by
schematising the arrival of new stakeholders (NGO, the
media or the courts) and changes concerning the relative
importance of the different stakeholders with, for exam-
ple, greater or lesser involvement of the role of the scien-
tiic community (Garcia, 2011) (igure 3). 
The adaptation of co-management refers to the idea of
adaptive co-management developed in the case of rene-
wable natural resources, including isheries resources, or
socio-ecosystems (Borrini-Feyerabend et al, 2000; Dietz
et al, 2003; Olsson et al, 2004; Folke et al, 2005, Pomeroy
and Rivera-Guieb, 2006; Plummer and Armitage, 2006).
Adaptive co-management is iterative: It repeats a process
in stages to lead managers and ishers to a result approa-
ching the one that was sought. Adaptive co-management
is based on a slow social and institutional learning pro-
cess. It involves devising plans that can be renegotiated
and amended as changing conditions and needs dictate.
This implies that each process for drawing up or imple-
Decision makers
Scientists
Fishermen
NGOs
Media
Tribunals
C1 - Conventional
B1 - Conventional,
 Participatory
C2 - Scientiic
 Co-Management
C3 - Community-based,
 audited
B3 - Community-based,
 advised
A - Traditional
 Community-based D - Centralized, modern
B2 - Empirical
 Co-management 
Figure 3 Potential changes in one type of co-management (adapted from Garcia, 2011)
Box 1 Application of adaptive co-management
to ishery
according to Borrini-Feyerabend et al, 200O; Pomeroy
and Rivera-Guieb, 2006 
(Additional information in the technical report)
A ishing community intends to try out a new method
of ishing and judge how the results obtained match or
agree with the expected results. The community as a
whole, or a part of it, will accept, adapt or reject the i-
shing method. This deliberate experimentation, ap-
prenticeship and adaptation on the part of the ishers
are an essential component of adaptive management,
which also relies on the willingness to learn of the ins-
titutions concerned. When the learning is shared (in-
cluding institutional learning) between stakeholders
who have negotiated and delegated the implementa-
tion of co-management arrangements, this is an adap-
tive co-management approach
menting an adaptive co-management plan is speciic to
the country and site, and cannot be reproduced identi-
cally (box 1).
10
2.3 The choice of the type of co-management and the different scales of isheries co-management
When drawing up a plan or a project, or reorganising a
project in progress, the type of co-management can be
chosen based on the following items (according to IUED's
analysis framework (Hufty, 2007; Weigel, 2011)): 
■ Deine each problem to be dealt with as expressed by
the stakeholders in a speciic context
■ Characterise the stakeholders with interests related to
the problem identiied and differentiated according to
their status and positioning 
■ Identify the nodes around which the stakeholders' in-
terests converge or diverge 
■ Specify the local, governmental or “global” norms that
orient the behaviour of the stakeholders 
■ Take into account the challenge of reconstituting the
processes or the succession of states isheries manage-
ment goes through 
The question of scale arises mainly on the level of the pro-
blem to be dealt with: local, national, regional, trans-
boundary or transnational. Co-management may be
applied on the scale of a ishery or a set of isheries, stocks
of sedentary or highly migratory ish species, a locally si-
tuated ecosystem or a wider ecosystem. With the promo-
tion of the ecosystem approach, we witness an extension
of the scale considered, from co-management of a ishery
to co-management at the level of an ecosystem. This ex-
tension can reach the transnational scale as part of the co-
operative co-management of shared stocks of ish
(transboundary, straddling or highly migratory). The de-
termining of scales and taking into account of interactions
between the different scales are key elements of isheries
co-management (cf. section 3.6: co-management in the
management of isheries). The precautions to be taken in
terms of mobilising the stakeholders at each scale are co-
vered in “Implementing co-management" (cf. section
3.6.4).
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SUMMARY OF THE LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM
THE LITERATURE, INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES
AND POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION
3.1 The drivers of co-management
From an analysis of the literature and experiences of co-
management, constants emerge concerning the drivers of
co-management. First of all, the diversity of points of view
depending on the stakeholder expressing them, followed
by some universal drivers. 
With regard to the Japanese co-management experience,
Watanuki (2007) insists on the diversity of points of view
in terms of co-management drivers depending on whe-
ther they are expressed by the government, the users of
the resource, or the defenders of sustainable develop-
ment. 
■ From the government's point of view, the driver is often
reducing management costs, particularly those related to
control and surveillance but also those related to data ga-
thering
■ From the point of view of the users, the drivers are to
re-establish an economic surplus, reduce conlicts, involve
these same users in the deining of management goals and
in their implementation using a participatory approach 
■ From the point of view of the defenders of sustainable
development, the driver is an approach to the sustaina-
ble exploitation of the resource. 
For each type of ishing, the Australian Fisheries Research
and Development Corporation (2008) gives nineteen co-
management drivers, the main ones concern partnerships
and shared responsibility, management transparency, en-
hancing conidence, management lexibility and a better
capacity to respond to expressed needs, management at a
iner scale, acceptance and conformity with decisions
taken, equity or socio-cultural considerations, reconciling
economic development and environmental protection,
conlict reduction and resolution, and reducing the costs
of isheries development (table 1).
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Table 1 Co-management drivers by type of ishing 
(inspired by Fisheries Research and Development Corporation, 2008)
Partnerships and shared responsibility for achieving common results Commercial, recreational, native
Reducing conlicts, improving conidence and working relations
between managers and ishers  Commercial, recreational, native
Reducing the necessity for political decisions  Commercial, recreational, native
Transparency of the costs of management and service provisions Commercial, recreational, native
Reducing management costs Commercial, recreational, native
To examine the existing regulatory approach and the possibility of developing
more effective management  Commercial, recreational, native
Improving acceptance and conformity of decisions in terms of management Commercial, recreational, native
More encompassing and transparent decision-making  Commercial, recreational, native
Flexibility and the ability to adapt in "real time" Commercial, recreational, native
Improving innovation capacity and the response to the sector's development needs Commercial, recreational, native
Capacity building and skills development  Commercial, recreational, native
Improving public opinion regarding the sector  Commercial, recreational
Improving cooperation between ishers Commercial, recreational
Improving the isheries investment climate  Commercial
The possibility of better social results via a better work-life balance Commercial, recreational, native
The possibility of highlighting the economic and social importance
of the impacts of the recreational ishing   Recreational
The implementation and recognition of environmental management
systems and codes of good practice Commercial, recreational, native
Enhanced dissemination and education  Commercial, recreational, native
Spatial or regional management on a iner scale Commercial, recreational, native
Driver Type of ishing
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3.2 Review of the costs and beneits of co-management
The literature highlights the dificulty of precisely identi-
fying the costs and beneits pertaining exclusively to co-
management, as well as the complexity of assessing them.
This points to a lack of methodology on the subject. Ho-
wever, the majority of studies converge towards the
conclusions mentioned below.
■ The costs speciic to co-management relate mainly to
the transaction costs involved in the new induced contrac-
tual arrangements: initiation, application, control and
adaptation of contractual relations (Williamson, 1998;
Verhaegen and van Huylenbroeck, 2002). These costs can
be broken down into ex ante and ex post (McCann et al,
2005), direct or indirect (Amblard et al. 2008), explicit or
implicit such as opportunity costs (McCann et al. 2005). 
■ Co-management leads to higher short-term costs (in
particular the costs of information and ixing objectives)
than a centrally-management system. But in the long
term, co-management fosters a reduction in costs (in par-
ticular the costs of distributing the resource among users,
monitoring and surveillance, and regulation enforcement)
(Hanna, 1995; Viswanathan et al, 2008) (box 2).
Box 2 Comparison and trend in
management costs of a co-managed
ishery and a centrally-managed
ishery
according to Viswanathan et al, 2008
(additional information in the technical report)
The management costs of a co-managed ishery were
compared with those of a centrally-managed ishery in
the region of San Salvador in the Philippines. Three
phases were deined for the period of nine years the
project ran (1988-96). The irst corresponds to the
start-up of the co-management project characterised
by the deining of the management structures; the se-
cond phase corresponds to the implementation of the
co-management project with the mobilisation of all the
stakeholders. During the irst two phases, the mana-
gement costs of the co-managed ishery were higher,
which can be explained by a more intensive commu-
nity education effort, among other things. But the trend
reverses during the third phase, during the operatio-
nal hand-over to local players: the management costs
of the co-managed ishery decrease, as do those of sur-
veillance, regulation enforcement and conlict resolu-
tion.
The speciic beneits of co-management, according to Bor-
rini-Feyerabend et al (2004), are:
■ Reduced costs in the long term 
■ Better distribution of costs across a larger number of
stakeholders following the sharing of management res-
ponsibilities 
■ An attenuation in the threats to conservation and the
use of resources on the part of outside interests, following
the alliances set up between government agencies and
local players
■ Greater potential eficiency thanks to the pooling of
knowledge and local skills (for example, in terms of the
surveillance of the state of natural resources or the main-
taining of sustainable exploitation practices).
The review of costs and beneits indicates the advantages
of co-management (Pinkerton, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Po-
meroy and Berkes, 1997; Singleton, 1998; Carlsson and
Berkes, 2005; Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb, 2006). Co-ma-
nagement:
■ induces a better distribution of jobs for it encompasses
a wide range of capacities (from State to local communi-
ties) and comparative advantages
■ fosters the building of a network for exchanging tech-
nology, scientiic expertise, information on volumes
caught or the status of ishing resources
■ connects different types and levels of organisation: the
representatives of these different types and levels coor-
dinate their activities on a speciic zone or resource
■ leads to more involvement of ishers in managerial
jobs, taking into consideration their know-how and ex-
pertise
■ builds the capacity of the ishers to conceive and im-
plement regulatory measures appropriate to local condi-
tions
■ leads to a reduction in long term costs, after an initial
phase in which costs are higher
■ facilitates conlict resolution, and therefore long term
planning and the desire to invest in the appropriate insti-
tutions
■ encourages the sharing of risks contrary to a manage-
ment system that leans on only one or two stakeholders
■ fosters the transparency and independence of the sys-
tem
■ leads the ishers to consider the resource as a long term
asset
■ enhances acceptability and legitimacy through com-
munity involvement.
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3.3 The tools for assessing co-management potential
An assessment of the potential of co-management can be
an asset in the initial or subsequent analysis of a co-ma-
nagement project. This assessment requires appropriate
tools. According to the literature, there are three major
tools. 
■ listing of all costs and beneits whether ex ante or ex
post, direct or indirect, explicit or implicit, such as the cost
and gains of opportunity (Hanna, 1995; Borrini-Feyera-
bend et al. 2004; Viswanathan et al, 2008). 
■ a linear regression model relating the level of success of
a co-management system (measured by a composite
index) to a series of variables considered as explanatory
factors (community quotas, social cohesion, etc.). The re-
gression serves to conigure a decision tree which classi-
ies the importance of the different factors in the success
of the co-management. The results are represented gra-
phically in the form of a decision tree (Gutierrez et al,
2011). 
■ an evaluation grid of the co-management potential of
several areas or isheries, constituted by indicators divi-
ded into three classes depending on whether they relate
to ex-ante conditions, conditions during implementation,
or conditions regarding the community values and prin-
ciples of the isherfolk. A scale of assessment is proposed
concerning the validation of the conditions under consi-
deration, and then a global aggregate score is assigned to
each case study. This scale of assessment can be used to
highlight the area or ishery with the greatest co-mana-
gement potential (Fargier, 2012). 
3.4 Key success factors and principal dificulties in isheries co-management
3.4.1 The key factors for the success
of co-management
The success or failure of a co-management process is af-
fected by context-dependent variables that can be divided
into three categories: Those pertaining to the supra-com-
munity level, community level and the level of the house-
hold or individual (Pollnac, 1988; Pomeroy et al, 2011).
These key conditions concern the different stages (ex-
ante and while the co-management is in place) and the
different levels of organisation. The literature brings to
light fourteen key conditions for the success of co-mana-
gement in the ield of renewable and isheries natural re-
sources (Pinkerton, 1989; Ostrom, 1990, 1994; Berkes,
1997; Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997; Jentoft et al, 1998; Po-
meroy et al, 2001, 2011; Pomeroy et al., 2001, 2003, 2011;
Pomeroy and Goetze, 2003; Pinkerton, 2007; Guttierez et
al, 2011; Pomeroy et al. (2011). 
☞ The key factors that contribute to the success of a co-management process are the following:
■ The existence of decentralisation and delegation of authority on the part of the government, including the right to
organise and make arrangements concerning management
■ The existence of organisations prior to the co-management
■ Clear identiication of those who have the right to participate in management
■ The existence of mechanisms for the coordination of the government and community concerned
■ The existence of cooperation and direction at community level
■ The participation of all the stakeholders involved and group cohesion characterised by the desire to engage in co
lective action and the common understanding of problems and alternative solutions
■ Adaptive co-management based on self-assessment and gradual adjustments leading managers and ishers to a r
sult approaching the desired one, and based on learning 
■ The drafting of collective decision-making rules and the enforcement of regulations and a penalty structure
■ Conlict resolution mechanisms
■ The recognition of traditional knowledge
■ Participatory monitoring and evaluation and a transparent distribution of information
■ Well-deined, suitable limits (community, resource, management area)
■ Beneits greater than costs and made explicit to the players.
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Another condition for success is a suficiently long period
for the co-management plan or project and sustainable
funding for the co-management system implemented. For
in fact, the processes associated with the sharing of res-
ponsibilities among several stakeholders in such a system
requires learning curves that last several years, whereas
national decision-makers and the donor agencies base
their intervention on short periods (most often under ive
years). The problem of sustainable funding is all the more
important as the evaluation, capitalising on lessons and
continuous adjustment must be estimated in relation to
long term goals and policies. There are numerous contra-
dictions, for, while seeking to secure the sustainability of
their actions, the national public authorities and donor
agencies lack political will and consistency, whereas new
mechanisms adapted to the speciic needs of co-manage-
ment are expected. 
Meeting these conditions leads to the success of the plan
or project and can potentially reverse the trend regarding
the status of the resource, social cohesion and conlict re-
duction (box 3).
Point for Take into account the timing of 
consideration processes and secure the 
n° 1 sustainability of co-management 
funding 
■ Integrate the learning time for the different co-ma-
nagement phases (pre-diagnostics, design, implemen-
tation, monitoring-evaluation) in order to build trust
and enable a better match between means deployed
and expected results 
■ Steer towards public policies and project funding
mechanisms (donors/institutions) that take into ac-
count the length of the learning process associated
with co-management (in excess of ten years, generally)
■ Estimate the costs of a programme co-management,
distinguishing between ex ante and ex post, direct and
indirect, explicit and implicit costs of the different co-
management phases 
■ Make sure the different stakeholders concerned
have the capacity to fund their participation in the dif-
ferent co-management phases and fully play their part 
■ Develop mechanisms for the redistribution of fun-
ding and allocation of iscal resources speciic to the
local communities or organisations involved in co-ma-
nagement
■ Develop innovative mechanisms for the long term
funding of co-management (trust fund, taxes, etc.)
Box 3 Trend reversal related to
co-management: the example of the
Mape dam in Cameroon (1988-2005)
Authors: Bozena Stomal and Jean Yves Weigel (additio-
nal information in the technical report)
according to Belal and Baba (2006), Bigombe (2002)
In 1988, the illing of the Mape dam (550 square kilo-
metres) in Cameroon attracted more than 4,000 ishers
in 128 camp settlements using a multitude of types of
gear and sometimes illegal ishing practices. The multi-
ethnic community, diversity of interests and diver-
gences in the management of the areas shook social
cohesion and created tension and conlicts. This wor-
rying situation led the administrative authorities and
the Fisheries Department to initiate a co-management
process in 2002. The following activities were given
priority: the setting up of a committee in 2003, the run-
ning of social communication campaigns, the organi-
sation of communities and training for stakeholders
(negotiation, management plan). 
In 2005, an assessment showed a trend reversal that
was attributed to co-management. The achievements
of the co-management process were to build social co-
hesion and reduce conlicts, as well as enhancing sta-
keholder cooperation, better enforcement of the
regulations and a decrease in juvenile catches.
3.4.2 The major dificulties associated
with co-management
One of the irst dificulties of co-management derives
from the necessity of a certain degree of independence on
the part of the local communities to whom authority is
delegated in terms of management, rights and responsi-
bilities. The main obstacle to this independence may ema-
nate from government agencies that refuse to give up
their powers, whether at national or local level. 
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Box 4 Problematic co-management:
the example of Senegal
Author: Jean Yves Weigel,
adapted from Ministry of Maritime Economy (2011)
(additional information in the technical report)
In Senegal, the authorities are more concerned about
enforcing administrative procedures than running the
Local Artisanal Fishing Committees (CLPA), the main
operating constraints of which are: the lack of coordi-
nation between the different levels they comprise, the
low involvement of grass-roots players in decision-ma-
king, the inadequate capacities of the players, the pas-
sive attitude of the authorities, the lack of operating
means, the lack of technical and inancial support from
the authorities, the absence of synergism with the ini-
tiatives of the other programmes or projects of the Ma-
ritime Fisheries Department, the use of the CLPA in the
validation of initiatives without their prior involve-
ment in design, and the lack of dynamics of certain
CLPAs in taking initiatives. 
There are six types of causes of this situation. The irst
is the absence of a clear strategy with precise objec-
tives assigned to the CLPA. The second is defective
communication. The third cause relates to training pro-
grammes that are ill-adapted and intermittent. The
fourth cause is the lack of empowerment of the players.
The ifth cause is the lack of devolution of inancial
means. The sixth cause is the existence of several re-
gulatory texts ill-adapted to the ishing sector.
Une deuxième dificulté de la cogestion a trait à l’intégra-
tion des savoirs locaux dans la prise de décision. L’inté-
gration de ces savoirs permet des appréciations
qualitatives nécessaires et très utiles dans le cas de socio-
écosystèmes caractérisés par une grande incertitude et
des processus naturels irréversibles. Une des dificultés
notables dans la gestion des pêches a été la différence
d’appréciation de l’état et des conditions de la ressource
entre les communautés locales, les scientiiques et les
agences gouvernementales. 
A third dificulty is the obligation for transparent pro-
cesses, decisions, and the results of research, monitoring
and evaluation. This transparency favours not only the
comprehension and apprenticeship of all the stakehol-
ders, but also their participation and implication in the
implementation of co-management. This obligation pre-
supposes methods for updating and disseminating infor-
mation to the stakeholders as a whole.
A fourth dificulty relates to the complexity of factoring in
all the functions critical to effective isheries manage-
ment; one pitfall to be avoided being excessive focus on
one such function, which could lead to partitioning that
would be prejudicial to the effectiveness and sustainabi-
lity of the co-management. 
A ifth dificulty concerns the equitable allocation of ac-
cess and of the resource itself. This is because co-mana-
gement projects often include restrictions, or even
exclusions, pertaining to local ishers (industrial or arti-
sans) or foreign ishers. To mitigate the effects of these
restrictions or a possible exclusion, considerations of
equity accompanied by attenuation or compensation
measures should prevail. Managing these compensation
measures can also engender dificulties (cf. section 3.6.5).
A sixth dificulty relates to the coordination of stakehol-
ders. The increased power of certain stakeholders (i-
shers' communities, NGOs) brings about the necessity of
intensive coordination. In particular to avoid redundancy
(check the justiication of new institutions before they are
created) and competition between “development bro-
kers” in the least developed countries. 
A seventh dificulty resides in the change of scale with the
problem of the transferability of generalisations from a
much localised situation to a broader spatial co-manage-
ment framework (Raakjaer Nielsen et al, 2004). In the
case of the co-management of stocks on the scale of a
large ecosystem or of shared stocks, one speciic dificulty
is the distribution of powers among community bodies,
government or international agencies who are guarantors
of the national or international legal regimes applicable
to ishing. 
The reasons for failure or problematic co-management
relate most often to the size of the zone concerned, the
weakness of accompaniment to the process, a per project
approach that is too short term, the lack of a clear stra-
tegy, lack of communication, inadequate structuring of
communities, no stakeholder empowerment, and the lack
of devolution of inancial means (Fargier, 2012; MEM,
2011; boxes 4 and 5).
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Box 5 Co-management dificulties
for an over-sized area and lack of long
term companion measures: the marine
responsible ishing area in the
Golfo Duce (Costa Rica
according to Luc Fargier (2012)
The scale of assessment of co-management from Far-
gier (2012) reveals that the marine responsible ishing
area in the Golfo Duce only meets a third of the neces-
sary conditions for the success of a co-management
process. The extensive area involved did not foster its
appropriation, management and surveillance, as
conirmed by the fact that most of the ishers do not
know where the boundaries of the area lie. Its sheer
size means that ishers far from the centre have to tra-
vel for three days to attend a meeting at the headquar-
ters of the marine area. This is an obstacle to the
ishers' participation in negotiating and implementing
the management plan. To this dificulty can be added
the number of communities concerned, the lack of
continuous technical support throughout the process,
the fact that a new approach is adopted for each (there
have been interventions from many opportunistic
NGOs who apply this type of logic). These elements
seem to be strong initial decisive factors that could ex-
plain the low co-management potential of the marine
resources of the Golfo Dulce. 
3.5 The principal conditionality
of isheries co-management 
3.5.1 Clariication of the legal, institutional
and administrative framework 
The legal, institutional and administrative framework is
typically ill-adapted to co-management or lacks consis-
tency. The principles of co-management are rarely asser-
ted or recognised, the rights of stakeholders and the
sharing of responsibilities typically not really clariied and
not secured. Steering by means of a rigid institutional and
administrative framework is not suited to processes that
evolve, which are typical of isheries resource co-mana-
gement. The incorporation of the principles of co-mana-
gement into isheries sector policy on an institutional or
administrative level, as well as in terms of means, has not
been achieved, or, in some instances, even started.
Point for Adapt the legal, institutional and
consideration administrative framework of
n° 2 co-management; integrate
co-management into isheries
sector policy
■ Adapt the legal framework to co-management
prior to the implementation of plans or projects inclu-
ding the:   
- assertion of the principles of co-management (part-
nership and shared responsibility, transparency and
lexibility, local scale) within the framework of effec-
tive decentralisation 
- securing of co-management rights to render them en-
forceable  
- capacity and the possibility for rights holders to ob-
tain compensation 
- protection of individuals against abuse of local po-
wers
- nature of the legal and administrative provisions (bin-
ding, non-binding, compulsory, voluntary, etc.)
- nature and extent of the recognition of locally pro-
mulgated rules
- limits and conditions of State intervention
- methods for interaction between partners and with
the State 
- recognition of speciic isheries co-management ar-
rangements and their adaptability (mechanisms, regu-
lations, speciic measures)
■ Integrate co-management into isheries sector
policy on an institutional and administrative level
by:
- Afirming completed decentralisation as a prerequi-
site to co-management and the guideline for isheries
policy
- Including as part of the isheries sector policy a sta-
tement of principle on the necessity of co-management
for transparent, consultative and participatory mana-
gement
- Clarifying mandates, powers and the institutional and
administrative coordination relative to the isheries
sector 
- Redirecting institutional and administrative means 
- Support for innovative research meeting the needs of
co-management, capable of incorporating local know-
ledge into the decision- making process and assessing
the impacts of co-management, combining local level
decision-makers and researchers
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3.5.2 Stakeholder capacity building
Local and national stakeholders do not all have the same
capacity to discuss, negotiate and choose the manage-
ment rules. They do not control all the vocabularies, the
technical aspects of resource management, the issues at
stake related to the different implementation phases of a
co-management process. The lack of clariication of goals,
of respective roles, lack of attention paid to dissemination
needs can affect consensus and management decisions. 
The stakeholders' availability for cooperation partly de-
pends on their diversity, history and socio-cultural refe-
rences. Improvement can be attempted but it remains a
management constraint to be reckoned with. Accompani-
ment, training-action in an iterative, progressive process
constitutes one of the major challenges for projects in-
volving co-management arrangements.
Point for Stakeholder capacity building
consideration and empowerment 
n° 3
■ Assess the effective capacities and needs in terms
of control over the negotiation processes and tools
used. This assessment should be done for each stake-
holder, given the different co-management phases they
take part in. The phases and actions in terms of co-ma-
nagement must be conceived in accordance with a rea-
listic assessment of the stakeholders' co-management
capacities.
■ In plans or projects, develop a “capacity building”
component in the form of a “training-action” adapted
to needs, integrated into the co-management process
and drawing on methodology guides and processes in-
volving the representatives of local players in their di-
versity.
■ Build the capacity of the stakeholders involved in
co-management in terms of participation, negotiation
of agreements, conlict resolution, etc.
3.5.3 The necessity for reliable data
and suitable tools
The lack of data on the socio-ecosystems concerned and
the territories they are rooted in, which relates to a lack of
means on the part of the research centres in the SRFC
member States, represents one of the major dificulties
for setting up co-management schemes. Some of these
weaknesses affect, or even inluence, the diagnostics. On
the other hand, this causes regular calling into question,
which affects dialogue and decision-making within the
areas of consensus.
The lack of spatialisation of data on the socio-ecosystems
exploited (players, habitats, resources, etc.) is important.
Spatialisation is the basis for ecosystem management and,
for example, for the allocation of territorial usage rights in
the coastal zone. It is therefore urgent to improve the data
collection process pertaining to the spatial structures of
isheries (distribution and migration of stocks, distribu-
tion and migration of leets, nurseries, breeding grounds),
to vulnerable marine ecosystems, zones where vulnera-
ble species are concentrated, various prohibition zones,
etc.
A review of the tools for assessing co-management shows
a relative weakness concerning the indirect and implicit
cost-beneits analysis as well as the illing in of their indi-
cators. The robustness and simplicity of the indicators
and an improvement in the arrangements for gathering
and centralising data are to be sought.
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Point for Complete and spatialise the data
consideration on isheries socio-ecosystems,
n° 4 improve measuring tools,
ill in co-management indicators
■ Complete the missing data on the socio-ecosystems
potentially co-managed by boosting the resources of
the national research institutions, by securing regular
monitoring of socio-economic and bio ecological go-
vernance, by integrating traditional knowledge or
knowledge from previous projects. 
■ Promote the development of spatialised co-mana-
gement with the creation of databases, digitalisation of
data, in the GIS data format, in particular, the produc-
tion of an atlas. These elements must be coordinated
at national and regional level. 
■ Improve the tools for assessing co-management, in
particular cost-beneit analyses, by providing more in-
depth estimates of indirect and implicit costs and be-
neits and developing and testing cost-beneit
indicators at sub-regional level.
■ Identify and ill in the co-management indicators
making use of methodological achievements, drawing
inspiration from and adapting the indicators of gover-
nance (level of participation and involvement of stake-
holders, degree of interaction between stakeholders,
perception of stakeholders, how the legislation
matches co-management, level of conlict, etc.). These
co-management indicators must be completed by
socio-economic indicators giving precedence to the ef-
fects of ecosystem uses on the local economy (revenue,
jobs, net added value, etc.), and bio ecological indica-
tors (abundance, biomass, speciic richness, trophic
level, etc.)
■ Develop a methodology guide: “design, implemen-
tation and assessment of isheries co-management” (in
the form of instruction sheets) adapted to the speciic
features of the SRFC domain and regularly improved
through stakeholder feedback on use.
☞ The sharing of functions (data acquisition, monitoring system, surveillance and application of sanctions, assessment)
between the main stakeholders leads to a distinction between the elaboration phase and the implementation of a ma-
nagement plan (tables 2 and 3), and the identiication, for each function, of the stakeholders concerned, whether ishing
communities or ishers' associations, government agencies, outside agents, or other stakeholders (Pomeroy and Rivera-
Guieb, 2006).  The effectiveness of a co-management plan is associated with the fact that the responsibilities for each func-
tion are clearly deined, each function is rooted in an institution and possesses means, and the functions are integrated
(cf. box 6 and technical report).
3.6 La cogestion dans la gestion des pêches 
The analysis of how co-management is included in ishe-
ries management led us to consider the sharing of func-
tions associated with isheries management, decision-
making cycles and processes in an uncertain milieu, to
distinguish the design and drawing up of a co-manage-
ment plan or a project from the implementation, revie-
wing one by one the technical measures for isheries
development applicable to co-management, then going
into greater depth on certain subjects of interest for the
SRFC area. These are: transboundary and transnational
co-management, integration of isheries co-management
and Marine Protected Areas, application of co-manage-
ment to artiicial reefs and ish-aggregating devices. 
3.6.1 The sharing of the functions
associated with isheries management
All operational isheries management systems take seve-
ral functions into account. This may appear complex to
implement in a co-management system with levels of sha-
ring that vary depending on the expected results. It is sim-
pliied by the use of grids describing the isheries
management functions in three broad categories (cf. ta-
bles above and technical report): Decision support, deci-
sion-making, implementation of decisions, which clariies
the position of the functions of knowledge acquisition,
monitoring, control & surveillance and planning. 
These grids allow decision-makers to take the different
technical parameters into account more effectively and
coordinate the strategies related to isheries manage-
ment.
22
Table 2 Simpliied grid of the functions involved in isheries management (according to Yan Giron)
Decision support Basic knowledge acquisition
 Information system
 Expert system 
Decision Deinition of a guideline
 Actual decision-making 
 Deinition of administrative rules 
Operational implementation of decisions The monitoring and application of rules (surveillance and control)
 The legal capacity to sanction offenders
 The capacity to enforce legal decisions
The major functions associated with
isheries management
The name of the function associated
with isheries management
Table 3 Distribution of stakeholders' activities in a co-management plan
(adapted from Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb, 2006)
Fishing
communities
or associations
Government
Outside agents
(NGOs, etc.)
Other
stakeholders 
■ Participation in the negotiation and drafting
 of the plan 
■ Contribution to the formulation of the goals
 of the plan 
■ Contribution of information and comments
 on the plan project 
■ Contribution to the mission statement 
■ Organisation of meetings 
■ Participation in the co-management
 organisational diagram 
■ Elaboration of community consensus 
■ Contribution of a legislative, public policy
 and planning framework 
■ Participation in negotiation and planning 
■ Assistance in identifying sources of inancing 
■ Participation in the organisation of the
 co-management 
■ Invitations to and running of meetings 
■ Clariication of responsibilities 
■ Facilitation of the negotiation and planning
 processes 
■ Technical support and training 
■ Assistance with the setting up of a
 co-management organisation  
■ Training in negotiation and planning 
■ Assistance with the mission statement 
■ Elaboration of consensus 
■ Participation in the negotiation and drafting
 of the plan 
■ Contribution of information and comments
 on the plan project 
■ Participation in the implementation of the plan 
■ Conformity with rules and regulations 
■ Participation in the monitoring of the
 implementation of the plan 
■ Active participation in educational and
 training activities  
■ Proposals in terms of development and of
 means of existence 
■ Contribution of information and comments
 on the plan implementation 
■ Assistance with the implementation
 of the plan 
■ Institutionalisation of a structure for the
 implementation of the plan 
■ Writing and approval of laws, decrees or orders
■ Assistance and support with fund raising  
■ Organisational capacity building for
 obtaining funds 
■ Technical support and training 
■ Strengthening of community organisations 
■ Training of managers 
■ Assistance in monitoring 
■ Support in terms of development and of
 means of existence 
■ Participation in the implementation of the plan 
■ Conformity with rules and regulations 
■ Contribution of information and comments
 on the plan implementation 
Stakeholder Activities during set up Activities during implementation
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Box 6 Integration of several functions in a co-management system:
the example of the scallop (France)
Author: Yan Giron (additional information in the technical report)
The management of the exploitation of scallops in the Bay of St Brieuc is an example of the sharing of responsibili-
ties and isheries management functions in the coastal strip. In France, coastal resource management is conducted
in a form of co-management involving professionals and the State, with the support of scientiic evaluations. For this
stock, the management tasks are shared as follows. At the start of the campaign, professional vessels collect samples
to conduct a biomass evaluation. The scientists then generate an exploitation advisory notice. The shellish commis-
sion of the Regional Fisheries Committee ixes the levels of capture authorised based on this notice and submits it to
the State for legal validation. The ishers perform the daily regulation and control measures as follow: time of ishing,
duration of ishing, aerial veriication. The State services conduct all or part of the control, with any legal actions or
combating illegal traficking conducted in parallel. In the event of an infringement, the representatives of the pro-
fession ile a complaint against the offenders and may deine internal penalties (suspension of licences, or other).
This system has allowed the ishery to become one of the best managed in Europe, enabling the ishers to reduce
operating costs, better manage commercialisation and sustainably maintain their activity. This form of co-manage-
ment is technically ine-tuned. It comes at a cost. But the beneits have made it possible to sustainably share ishing
potential between large numbers of ishers, since the 1980s.
3.6.2 Decision-making cycles and processes 
Fisheries management entails decisional processes that
are part of risk decision cycles in uncertain environments
and which transcend the scales of the decision (global, re-
gional, national or local). Compared to conventional i-
sheries development, adaptive co-management enables a
better completion of these cycles
through better implementation of
the decision processes thanks to a
set of interactions between the dif-
ferent stakeholders, according to a
gradual process (iterative and self-
evaluation or “step by step”). In par-
ticular, the cycles are characterised
by numerous feedback loops for re-
ining the management strategy and
possibly the sector policy at any
point in the cycle. This approach can
be recorded in a more or less formal
catalogue of good practices that re-
presents the social memory built up
over successive iterations on the
site under consideration.
Financing
Anchorage and isheries dialogue
Representativeness / Capacity
IMPLEMENTATION
/ MONITORING
PRE-DIAGNOSTIC
ASSESSMENT CONCEPTION
Science / knowledge
Participation
Information
Transparency
Figure 4 Cycles of decision-making and collaborative
implementation of isheries co-management
processes (according to Yan Giron)
24
3.6.3 The design and formulation
of a co-management plan or project
Pre-diagnostics are justiied by the frequent lack of clari-
ication of the issues at stake in the co-management in
liaison with an imprecise identiication of the problem fa-
cing the ishery (overcapacity, depletion of the resource,
etc.). More speciically, the link between the ishing pro-
blem and the existing system of governance and its pos-
sible weaknesses is rarely highlighted.
☞ There are several stages involved in the design and drawing up of a co-management plan or project: pre-diagnostics,
the setting up of a co-management body to draft the mission statement, the formalising of a co-management organisa-
tion encompassing an agreement on the rules and procedures for negotiation and decision-making, a co-management
plan or project, a co-management agreement which is the last stage of the design and set-up. Related to the conditionality
of co-management, the design and development require the adaptation of the legal, institutional and administrative
framework, the strengthening of the stakeholders, reliable data on the socio-ecosystems and suitable tools.
Point for Produce pre-diagnostics from
consideration data on the socio-ecosystems
n° 5 concerned
■ Identify and precisely analyse the problem of the i-
shery and the link with the issues at stake for co-ma-
nagement 
■ Relate this problem to the current system of gover-
nance and its possible weaknesses through an analyti-
cal framework (problem, players, norms, nodes,
processes) and to the illing in of indicators
■ Deine the major stakes for co-management, the
main goal and the speciic objectives in relation to the
isheries management functions
■ Choose the type of co-management suited to the
problem at hand and the stakes, which means giving
preference to certain stakeholders, a scale of analysis
and the determining of modes of interaction between
scales, and the relative importance of each stakehol-
How representative the stakeholders are and how they
are designated are a key factor in the smooth running of
co-management framework. Nonetheless, insuficient
consideration is sometimes given to existing organisa-
tions. The co-management body should be set up on the
basis of the local system of stakeholder representation to
the extent that this can be reconciled with co-manage-
ment. The body's constitution poses the problem of the
mobilisation and proper representation of all the stake-
holders concerned, in particular women and migrants. It
is understood that certain representatives will be mobili-
sed to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the type of
co-management, the scale concerned (not all the players
need to be mobilised on each geographic scale) and the
co-management phase. The co-management body writes
a mission statement stipulating the management goal,
strategy and values shared by the different stakeholders
(Margoluis and Salafsky, 1998). It ixes the co-manage-
ment organisation and establishes a co-management
agreement. It is the node for negotiation, decision-making
and the drafting of documents. It may be a formal or in-
formal body (Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb, 2006). 
The formalising of the co-management organisation en-
compasses the: 
■ agreement on the rules and procedures for negotiation
and decision-making which should contribute to the
transparency of the process (Borrini- Feyerabend et al,
2000), 
■ responsibilities of each stakeholder which must be re-
corded in the co-management organisation (Pomeroy and
Rivera- Guieb, 2006), 
■ choice of management unit which should refer to an
existing system of governance and pre-deined limits
(Berkes et al, 2001) and the size of which should be sufi-
ciently restricted to allow effective management (Fargier,
2012) but large enough to take ecological management
considerations into account (Pomeroy and Rivera- Guieb,
2006), 
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Point for Reinforce the co-management 
consideration body through adequate stakeholder
n° 6 representation and mobilisation
■ Identify and spatialize the stakeholders and their
existing governance method;
■ Try to simplify the co-management body and the
way it works;
■ Make sure the stakeholder representatives are truly
representative;
■ Give preference to the local system of stakeholder
representation to the extent that this can be reconci-
led with co-management;
■ Mobilise all the stakeholders concerned, without
omitting those who tend to be marginalised;
■ Choose the stakeholders to be mobilised according
to the scale in question and depending on each mana-
gement unit: local (ishing communities and local re-
presentatives of the sector, local powers, local
authorities, local groups and project managers, experts
and researchers), national (national ishers' organisa-
tions and sector players, central authorities, represen-
tatives of donors, experts and researchers), and
transnational (representatives of the countries, regio-
nal organisations, experts and researchers);
■ Specify the stakeholders to be mobilised for each
co-management phase, assigning them the status of de-
cision-maker or observer. 
■ co-management plan or project details the activities to
be conducted to achieve the objectives, the expected out-
puts, the schedule, the business plan estimating the cost
of the operations for each activity decided upon, to which
is associated a source and method of inancing (DENR et
al, 2001).
During project design or the development of a new phase,
the preparation for co-management should include the
deinition of a plan of action which should be budgeted
and inanced for the duration of the project. It should in-
corporate a system of evaluation and adjustment. It
should be validated collectively in order to enhance ow-
nership on the part of the different players. 
The drafting of a co-management agreement is the res-
ponsibility of the co-management body: It should have the
status of a rule or contract and should be respected. It de-
tails the composition of the management body, the roles
and obligations of the stakeholders, the description of the
co-management organisation, provisions for conlict re-
solution, monitoring and evaluation, and compensation
for aggrieved stakeholders (Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb,
2006; Borrini-Feyerabend et al, 2000). 
Point for Consolidate co-management
consideration organisation and determine
n° 7 a plan of action
■ Find a way of simplifying co-management organi-
sation 
■ Make sure there are mechanisms for steering the
transparency of the negotiation and decision processes 
■ Clarify the responsibilities of each stakeholder and
their organisational interactions, drawing on the ana-
lysis of their legitimacy and representativeness
■ Encourage institutional synergy between the local,
national and regional scales
■ Give preference to the matching of proposed activi-
ties with the weaknesses identiied in the pre-diag-
nostics at the level of each of the key isheries
management functions
■ Integrate into the co-management plan or project a
system for monitoring-evaluation, the cost of which
should be scheduled
■ Integrate into the co-management plan or project a
system for informing the population concerned about
the pre-diagnostics, co-management body, co-manage-
ment organisation, the proposed activities, the results
of the monitoring and evaluation and the decisions
taken
■ Integrate into the co-management plan or project a
system for the distribution and dissemination of tradi-
tional knowledge and the main results of the research,
taking local languages into account
■ If possible, integrate into the plan or project an ex-
pert system adapted to the type of co-management
chosen and the scale in question
■ Have the plan or project validated collectively so
that the stakeholders assume ownership of it
■ Put in place a legitimate co-management facilitator
and ensure there is sustainable funding for their ac-
tions
■ Give preference to collective learning (including ins-
titutional) of the stakeholders to foster the develop-
ment of the organisation within the framework of
adaptive co-management.
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3.6.4 The implementation of a co-management
plan or project 
TRANSPARENCY AND GRADUAL COLLECTIVE LEARNING
OF GOOD GOVERNANCE
Co-management depends, among other things, on the gra-
dual building of trust both in the instances and in the re-
liability of the information provided by each party. The
lack of information or outreach can contribute to the lack
of comprehension of the new processes and tools develo-
ped in co-management. This often leads to the partici-
pants having dificulty positioning themselves and acting
☞ The implementation of a co-management plan or project induces speciicities at the level of each of the main com-
ponents of the implementation (according to Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb, 2006), in terms of:
■ governance and involvement of the players; transparency, the dissemination of mechanisms, outputs and regularly
informing all the players consolidates the adaptive implementation of co-management which should develop step by
step. Along with sustainable funding of processes and facilitation, it contributes to consolidating the processes in the
long term;
■ the application of the regulations, control and enforcement of sanctions; the speciicities are the promotion by the 
communities or associations of isherfolk and their involvement in applying the rules, controling and enforcing sanctions;
■ control and surveillance, the speciicities concern the development of synergies between government agencies and
communities or organisations of isherfolk, as well as the redistribution of part of the related resources towards the
latter;
■ monitoring; co-management is accompanied by the involvement of all the stakeholders in gathering data and
choosing indicators, but also by the transparency of the results of the monitoring;
■ evaluation; the principal speciicity is a participatory approach which leads to experience feedback, fostering the
learning of all the stakeholders, including the institutions;
■ networking and advocacy; the speciicity of co-management is the effort to create and maintain interconnection
aswell as the encompassing of all the stakeholders which fosters the apprenticeship of co-management.
fully within the co-management process. In addition, the
studies and data produced by the research centres remain
obscure, little-disseminated and are not systematically
presented to the operators concerned by the co-manage-
ment. 
Furthermore, processes that are not consolidated, com-
mitments not met or discontinued support can sustaina-
bly affect the dialogue and involvement of the
stakeholders and therefore the governance as a whole. In
this sense, the sustained political will of the parties and
the meeting of commitments are to be sought, as well as
the development of sustainable funding mechanisms.
More or less intense disruptions
from the outside may also occur in
the course of the process (political
change, the addition of a new ins-
tance of representation, bio-clima-
tic effect on the resource, arrival of
a project run by an NGO or a new
donor agency, etc.). The consolida-
tion of collective learning and the
maintaining of strong institutional
and legal anchorage should make
it possible to cope with such dis-
ruptions.
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Point for Consolidate transparent and
consideration adaptive implementation of
n° 8 co-management as well a
information adapted to the
different scales
■ Implement successive cycles of increasing com-
plexity enabling start-up on small, achievable goals,
test and develop the system, reinforce collective lear-
ning of the process and of the way the instances of co-
management work; 
■ Check that the measures are coordinated in time
and space (geographically);
■ Regularly formalise the process and the new co-ma-
nagement responsibilities to allow each of the partici-
pants to understand the changes made to governance;
■ Accompany and make sure transparency is respec-
ted during the periods of transition and renewal of co-
management instances; 
■ Maintain information arrangements throughout the
duration: develop the mechanisms for information cir-
culation and transparency (between ministries,
players and sites, etc.), use multiple communication
tools, and take national languages into account. Assess
and improve the arrangements where necessary;
■ Promote traditional knowledge and involve resear-
chers and the expert system in the dissemination and
transmission of regular information to the players;
■ Take into account the different national languages
and multiple communication tools to disseminate the
results of the diagnostics, evaluations, decisions taken,
control measures and results of the enforcement of pe-
nalties, depending on the scales and the target players; 
■ Ensure sustainable funding for “information” and
the implementation of the co-management. Consoli-
date and perpetuate the national co-management fun-
ding mechanisms and take into account the critical
transition phases between major programme phases
to ensure continuity.
Box 7 The structured formulation of a
co-management plan: the example
of soleish ishery in The Gambia
Author: Jean Yves Weigel
(additional information in the technical report)
according to Ministry of Fisheries, 2012 and Tobey et
al, 2009
The Fisheries Act 2007 provides the legal basis for the
co-management of small-scale isheries in The Gambia.
The irst isheries co-management plan concerns arti-
sanal soleish ishing. The government of The Gambia,
in partnership with the USAID, the University of Rhode
Island and the WWF, supported this plan by organising
co-management workshops, direct training, collabora-
tive research and institutional capacity building. The
ishers and the industry also helped to formulate this
Plan with their knowledge of soleish ishery and by
gathering data. The Plan was designed as scalable in
keeping with availability and data analysis and changes
affecting catches and environmental conditions. A spe-
cial soleish management zone was promulgated en-
compassing the waters of the Atlantic shoreline and
shorelines adjacent to the estuarine areas of The Gam-
bia River out to 9 nautical miles. 
The Ministry in charge of ishing delegated exclusive
soleish ishery rights to NASCOM (National Sole Fi-
shery Co-Management Committee) and LACOM (Lan-
ding sites Co-Management Committees) which are
attached to it through the intermediary of the CFC
(Community Fisheries Centers). NASCOM consists of
representatives from the ishing communities, ish-
mongers and processors, LACOMS, the Gambian Arti-
sanal Marine Fisheries Development Association
(GAMFIDA), the National Association of Artisanal Fi-
shing Operators (NAAFO), municipalities, the Depart-
ment of Fisheries and the industrial sector.
In 2012, without anticipating on the development of
this co-management system, the lessons that can be
drawn are: an adequate legal and institutional frame-
work, the successful mobilisation and capacity building
of all the stakeholders involved, and the matching of
operating rules to objectives. 
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Box 8 Companion modelling as a possibility
for isheries co-management
(ComMod approach)
Authors: David de Monbrison and Pablo Chavance (ad-
ditional information in the technical report)
adapted from Bousquet and Voinov, 2010; Worrapim-
phong, K. et. al, 2010, The ComMod Group, 2009
The ComMod approach takes place in two phases. First
of all, the building of shared, spatialised diagnostics,
scenarios for future changes in the resource which are
explored by the players in the form of simulations
/game playing. Secondly, the results of the simula-
tions/game playing are used as the basis for deining
possibilities for improving the management of the re-
source in question and the building of collective com-
mitments.
This approach can usefully be developed in systems
with little information as it promotes traditional know-
ledge and collective learning, through a concrete vision
of the consequences of the decisions taken or of the op-
tions for ishery development. There are a number of
conditions for their application, including strong in-
volvement and investment by people and institutions,
both to effectively accompany the different stages and
to allow the optimal transfer of the tool and perpetua-
tion of the process undertaken.
Point for Optimise the enforcement
consideration of the regulations,
n° 9 control and surveillance
■ Deine the respective roles of the ishing communi-
ties and government agencies in the system for enfor-
cing the regulations;
■ Train new stakeholders involved in the chain of de-
cisions and sanctions and in the technical means for
control and surveillance;
■ Develop synergies between modern and traditional
control-surveillance systems thanks to the pooling of
means enabling active participation of the stakehol-
ders in determining the methods for control and sur-
veillance and sanctions;
■ Adopt dissuasive sanctions which vary depending
on the seriousness of the offence and amend them over
time;
■ Mobilise the requisite means, possibly with the use
of the funds generated from ines to pay for the control
and surveillance system;
■ Set up optimally cost-effective systems (AIS-Radar
systems combined with coastal telescopes);
■ Communicate the results, frauds and sanctions, ar-
rests, and any lessons to be drawn to increase trans-
parency and the sense of justice for those who respect
the rules.
The application of the regulations presupposes an effec-
tive, optimised control and surveillance system which re-
presents a considerable expense but may help to keep
conlicts at bay. Performance levels in this domain relate
to administrative and institutional capacity, the adequacy
of the legal framework, but also to the perception of the
players concerning the legitimacy of the measures bin-
ding on them. The direct involvement of the ishers, whe-
ther industrial or artisanal, is not devoid of risks since the
divergent interests of the players, combined with the de-
tection of illegal activities, expose the ishers to major re-
pressive actions. The deinition and conducting of the
plan or project relative to the application of the regula-
tions, control and surveillance, must also be appropria-
tely supervised with the corresponding means of
execution. The setting up of warning systems and the de-
velopment of synergies between government agencies to
be combined speciically according to each national or
local situation are recommended (cf. sheet no. 11 of the
technical document “Fisheries co-management and the
surveillance and control of ishing activities in Canada and 
CO-MANAGEMENT, CONTROL,
SURVEILLANCE AND REGULATION ENFORCEMENT
The application of the regulations pertaining to a co-ma-
nagement plan or project should follow four principles:
(i) the regulations must have the agreement of the asso-
ciations and individuals concerned, (ii) the promotion of
the application should be voluntary, (iii) socio-cultural
sensibilities must be taken into account, (iv) an oficial
public sanction should be practiced (Oposa, 1996).  En-
forcement of the regulations in a co-management system
requires the consultation and coordination of all the co-
management units; a co-managed ishery has the advan-
tage of a greater moral obligation on the part of isherfolk
and professionals in the sector who were involved in for-
mulating the regulations and the methods for applying
them.
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Benin”). However, the involvement of communities of ar-
tisan ishers in control and surveillance requires that the
artisan ishers keep within the limits stipulated by the le-
gislation and the operational procedures involving other
government players. This involvement poses the problem
of the redistribution and sustainability of the means
which are often assigned by the more or less serious in-
volvement of the stakeholders or the administrative au-
thorities concerned.
MONITORING-EVALUATION SYSTEMS
AND THE CO-MANAGEMENT PROCESS
The challenge for monitoring is to provide elements to as-
sess the degree of realisation of the activities scheduled
through the management plan or project and what should
be done to improve them. Monitoring is performed by ga-
thering data and calculating indicators which enable a
comparison of the effective results with a reference point.
The comparisons may concern the change that affected a
target group following the implementation of the plan or
compared to a similar group that was not targeted. Moni-
toring is a process of continuous examination of data as it
is collected, classiied and veriied, and of the conclusions
that can be drawn from it (Margoluis and Salafsky, 1998).
Co-management implies that all the stakeholders are in-
volved in data collection and the choice of indicators, but
also that the results of monitoring are presented to inter-
nal and external audiences in order to share them.
Evaluation, based on the monitoring, should diagnose im-
plementation problems, make adjustments and take the
decisions transposed into the annual work plan and bud-
get concerning the activities, the needs in term of re-
sources and inance. Concerning the evaluation
procedures for a management plan or project, there are
several different approaches: i) performance evaluation,
which aims to determine the extent to which goals and
speciic objectives have been achieved; ii) process eva-
luation, which examines how the goals and objectives
were achieved; iii) results evaluation, which concerns the
socio-economic and environmental impact of a co-mana-
gement plan; iv) evaluation of the costs and beneits (Mar-
goluis and Salafsky, 1998; Berkes et al, 2001). What is
speciic about evaluation in a co-management system is,
on the one hand, the importance given to governance in-
dicators, and, on the other hand, a participatory approach
to evaluation which, through the feedback it creates, fa-
vours learning among all the stakeholders, including the
institutions. 
Point for Set up a monitoring & evaluation
consideration system geared towards 
n° 10 co-management
■ Continuously collect the data required for illing in
the selected co-management indicators;
■ Carry out evaluations of performance, processes
and results (socio-economic and environmental im-
pacts), and lastly an evaluation of the costs and bene-
its; 
■ Diagnose the variances between actual activities
and planned activities; 
■ Transpose into the annual work plan the adjust-
ments decided on concerning the activities in respect
of monitoring, and adapt the needs in resources and i-
nance;
■ Give preference to iteration (progress step by step)
which facilitates the learning of co-management and
the evaluation of the processes.
THE ADVANTAGE OF NETWORKING
FOR CO-MANAGEMENT APPROACHES
Connecting the ishing community and its organisations
to the other stakeholders external to the community
through a network is critical for the success of co-mana-
gement in the long term. This should help establish links
by means of which the interests of the community can be
taken into account, that provide a source of technical sup-
port, and for sharing experience and strategy. These links
are forged with other communities and co-managed pro-
jects, NGOs and bilateral or multilateral technical support
systems, government bodies, and people of inluence such
as women or politicians (Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb,
2006).
3.6.5 Technical isheries development measures
that can be applied to co-management
The implementation of a co-management plan or project
may draw on technical measures used in conventional i-
sheries development: the introduction of ishing licences,
limitations relative to the ishing effort, such as the num-
ber of days or hours authorised, the seasonal or perma-
nent closure of ishing grounds, restrictions concerning
gear, catch quotas and total admissible catches (TAC), the
distribution of the total admissible catches between par-
ticipants in the ishery, individual ishing quotas (IFQ),
whether transferable (ITQ) or not, or minimum size limits 
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on ish. However, the TAC and quotas, and even more so
the ITQ, seem to pose a problem when it comes to artisa-
nal multi-species isheries in developing countries. We
could mention, for example, the dispersion of the ishing
units, the variety of ishing gear used, the collection of
data on the stocks subject to quotas, the limited capacity
of the managers, and equity considerations. 
This implementation may also draw on traditional deve-
lopment measures that typically concern territorial usage
rights to semi-open aquatic areas (lagoons) and are ex-
pressed as the seasonal or permanent closure of ishing
grounds, prohibitions or restrictions on certain ishing
techniques, or regulations on ishing effort (Weigel, 1985;
Freeman et al, 1991).  These measures may have a deli-
berate or incidental effect on the preservation of the i-
shing resources and the avoidance of conlicts over use,
but their localised nature, empiricism and the ambiguity
of their goals lead to a case-by-case analysis, prior to in-
tegrating them into the implementation of a co-manage-
ment plan.
The implementation of a co-management plan or project
may have an adverse effect on certain stakeholders, which
poses the question of compensation associated with tem-
porary measures (temporary exclusion, technical or bio-
logical stoppage) or deinitive measures (decommis-
sioning, destruction of ishing gear). However, the results
of compensation can be disappointing (Holland et al,
1999; Clark et al, 2005) insofar as they may encourage ir-
responsible behaviour on the part of the players and lead
to a "loss of the sense of ishing dialogue". 
The dificulty in establishing this dialogue resides essen-
tially in the possibility the stakeholders have of imple-
menting new, restrictive measures in isheries
management during the transition period, whereas the
beneits will only be felt later on. Some stakeholders may
have to stop their activity without the possibility of di-
versifying in Alternative Livelihoods and Income Genera-
ting Activities (AL/IGA); others may not be able to accept
a fall in income and prefer to refuse the measures, and re-
main in a deteriorated situation with an income that is
low but guaranteed in the short term. 
The technical measures relative to reducing overcapacity
in artisanal ishing arouse interest related to the role that
befalls the communities of artisan ishers in the imple-
mentation of co-management. The challenge of imple-
menting co-management, in this case, is to facilitate the
reduction of excess capacity (if overcapacity is the ishery
problem) without causing unacceptable perturbations to
Box 9 Co-management and individual
transferable quotas (ITQ
Authors: David de Monbrison and Jean Yves Weigel
(Additional information in the technical report)
adapted from Cléach M-P., (2008), Mongruel R. and
Palsson G. (2004), Buisson G and Barley M. (2007) and
Anderson L.G (2000)
Individual transferable quotas (ITQ) may appear to be
effective tools for reducing capacities as a complement
to or substitute for decommissioning schemes. They
are sometimes promoted as the least expensive me-
chanisms for reducing ishing pressure and helping to
achieve environmental resource management goals.
Nonetheless, this type of tool does not systematically
save on the costs of implementation (monitoring and
controls) due to the need for close stock management.
In highly industrialised, capital-intensive single species
isheries they become one management method
among others. However, for multi-species artisanal i-
sheries they present a large number of limitations and
risks in terms of concentration, external dependency
and, on a socio-economic level, they could weaken a
branch or a territory as a whole due to their impact on
society. Information on the positive and negative ef-
fects and recommendations for counteracting the ad-
verse effects of this management method are
illustrated by the examples from the literature given in
the technical report. The issues facing co-management
in terms of ITQ are therefore to:
■ measure the limits of these tools clearly and procure
more contradictory insights as to their advantages and
disadvantages,
■ develop co-management agreements that make
more room for ishing dialogue and the place of the i-
shers in decisions related to the management tools as-
sociated with the allocation of ishing rights,
■ develop, in a concerted manner, new mechanisms
that restrict the transferable aspect to prevent the phe-
nomena of concentration and dependency,
■ develop governance associated with the ITQ invol-
ving isheries management functions and companion
measures with robust inancing (research, coopera-
tion, surveillance) enabling adjustments. 
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society and the economy. This challenge points to the
complex diversity of the types of ishing and ishers, the
amplitude of ishing migrations, the high demographic
growth rate, the dependency of ishers with respect to the
resource, and the scarcity of alternative livelihoods to i-
shing (cf. technical report). It also points to the inlexibi-
lity and limited transferability of the production factors,
the lack of a coordinated and integrated economic deve-
lopment approach between ishing and other sectors and
the dificulties of implementing the “control, surveillance
and enforcement” function (Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb,
2006). 
Reducing excess artisanal ishing capacity implies rela-
ting isheries management measures to the socio-econo-
mic development of the communities and households of
isherfolk. The sustainable livelihoods approach offers
such a perspective of linking isheries management and
socio-economic development, all the more so as it can
only be implemented through a participatory approach
like co-management (Chambers and Conway, 1992; Ash-
ley and Carney, 1999).
3.6.6 The co-management of transboundary
and transnational isheries
Since the advent of the ecosystem approach, the scale of
co-management can be extended to a transnational level,
with cooperative management of shared stocks of ish
which, for certain authors, become co-managed stocks.
This explains why the management of certain transboun-
dary, straddling or highly migratory stocks is sometimes
classiied as cooperative management. In the literature, it
is essentially cooperative management or transnational
co-management of transboundary stocks that has been
developed. 
The co-management of transboundary stocks has mainly
been approached from the organisational, institutional,
normative, legal and economic angle in detail in the tech-
nical report (Russell and van der Zwaag (2010), Burke,
(1983) and van Houtte (2003), Björndal et al (2004),
Munro, (1979); Sumaila et al (2002)). In general, two le-
vels of cooperation are established: the irst level relates
to cooperation in terms of research which may be deci-
sive if the research is independent; the second level rest in
formulating a programme including an optimal long-term
management strategy, the allocation of catch shares, and
execution and enforcement methods. 
Point for Clarify the limits, application
consideration framework and nature of the
n° 11 compensatory and companion
measures associated with capacity
reduction in a co-managed system
■ Do not be naïve in terms of co-management: ishers
and the players are jointly responsible for the situa-
tions and there are numerous ways of bypassing mea-
sures. Consider that the destruction of gear remains
illusory, which can have numerous adverse effects in a
system where control and surveillance are not optimal;
■ Do not play a game of give and take: Aid is not made
available in return for restrictive measures. Nonethe-
less, it is important to properly measure the negative
impacts the communities must bear during the transi-
tion phase;
■ In a crisis situation, take drastic measures to resolve
a situation in two different ways relating to decom-
missioning: 
- i) exclude by directive, with compensation from
the State (Europe);
- ii) co-management of overcapacity with a concern
for the adequacy of available stocks (example of
scallops): This management requires highly effective
control and surveillance by the State and the
existence of exemplary sanction enforcement,
highly responsive and accurate searching, the
reduction of the exploitation periods adjusted to the
resource and to the market (ishing periods, hours
per day, etc.);
■ Take into account the fact that the AL/IGA may be
ineffective (temporary withdrawal from the effort, in-
centive to postpone effort, etc.) and give preference to
isheries dialogue and the responsibility of the players.
The institutional angle poses the question of the neces-
sity of creating a speciic body or of working with a
straightforward, informal structure. The answer may be
that this choice should be made depending on considera-
tions of cost, sovereignty and effectiveness, which point
to the complexity of the management problems to be re-
solved. In addition to the usual constraints related to na-
tional co-management, transboundary management
combines additional dificulties such as the formal signing
of international agreements, the coordination of national
authorities and dificulties in harmonising. 
34
Point for Test transboundary and 
consideration transnational co-management
n° 12 experiences with caution 
■ Build national governance and systems before de-
veloping transboundary or transnational co-manage-
ment, which is necessarily more complex, particularly
in terms of stock management, acquiring reliable bio-
ecological and socio-economic data (research, monito-
ring);
■ Draw on independent, impartial research;
■ Promote long-term co-management, more particu-
larly concerning technical measures. Integrate consi-
derations of sustainable exploitation of the resources
and give preference to an ecosystem-based approach;
■ Analyse the legal, institutional and administrative
constraints and develop and converge the correspon-
ding framework to enable decisions and the signing of
agreements relative to the management of stocks;
■ Develop collaboration between the States in the
sub-region in terms of measures and tools for the ma-
nagement of the stocks;
■ Deine responsibilities, adequate means and gua-
rantee them at the level of the countries concerned;
■ Adapt the institutional and administrative organi-
sation to considerations of sovereignty, effectiveness
and cost;
■ Find the smallest common denominator before be-
ginning the transition from national co-management
to transboundary or transnational co-management,
particularly regarding the deinition of an agreed ma-
nagement target for the shared stock;
■ Ensure transnational agreement on goals for stock
and isheries management so that the technical mea-
sures implemented on all sides do not cancel each
other out at the level of a stock taken as a whole;
■ Assess the costs and beneits of the different com-
ponents of transboundary or transnational co-mana-
gement;
■ Promote the capacity of the Conference of Ministers
of the SRFC to take binding decisions for implementing
the necessary regional agreements.
3.6.7 The integration of isheries
co-management and a marine protected area
This section is a summary of the elements produced in
the “Review of the State-of-the-art in the role of MPAs in
isheries management” also published by the SRFC in
2011 (cf. the corresponding technical and summary re-
ports). Co-management has been recognised as the most
eficient form of governance for both MPAs and for ishe-
ries (Garcia et al, 2011). Integrating the co-management
of a ishery and of an MPA nonetheless poses problems of
adjustment, evaluation of joint positions and the funda-
mental differences to be accommodated after an objective
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages. This re-
quires the development of linkages between the different
institutions at every scale, and represents a major chal-
lenge with innovative experimentation at institutional
level.
An observation of isheries and MPA management at the
level of the sub-region shows a lack of consistency and
synergy which is an obstacle to the design, formulation
and implementation of co-management plans or projects:
■ The legal, institutional and administrative framework
of the ishing sector and the MPAs is rarely harmonised,
and institutional linkages often entirely absent. Yet these
connections are precisely what makes it possible to de-
velop a higher national integration framework, identify a
leading institution and clarify the roles and the distribu-
tion of tasks, to jointly deine and develop co-manage-
ment plans, and achieve economies of scale in spatialised
management;
■ The development of the co-management of a ishery or
an MPA is often not harmonised, which makes arrange-
ments more complex, in particular for the enforcement of
regulations, monitoring and evaluation, control and sur-
veillance;
■ The management of migratory resources and the de-
velopment of transnational networks are often not en-
ough to decree the transboundary co-management of a
ishery or an MPA;
■ It is often not clear whether it is appropriate to create
an MPA to resolve a problem related to ishing, or asso-
ciated with a speciic resource, rather than using other
tools, which imply straightforward spatial or temporal
restrictions on ishing;
■ The necessity of regulating ishing capacity taking into
account artisanal ishing is often not suficiently empha-
sised prior to the creation of an MPA, in particular when
migratory species are involved. Whatever the resources
involved, the effectiveness of an MPA in relation to ishe-
ries management in fact resides in effective control of the
ishing capacity and effort.
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Box 10 The Cote Bleue Marine Park. An MPA
set up and managed with the ishers.
Thirty years in existence (France)
Author: David de Monbrison, Elisabeth Tempier (addi-
tional information in the technical report)
When the modest Carry le Rouet reserve (85 ha) was
created in 1983, at the initiative of Frédéric Bachet
backed by the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur Regional
council, Marine Protected Areas were not in fashion,
and only professional ishers concerned by the area
showed their approval by supporting biological reco-
very, in the spirit of the tradition of the "prud’homies
de pêche" dating back to the 14th century. Monitoring
studies quickly conirmed the expected build up of
stocks (reserve effect). As trawlers frequently crossed
the coastal strip illegally, cooperation between i-
shers/managers/administration gradually turned into
a real partnership, with the planting of anti-trawler
posts, artiicial production reefs and inally, a second
reserve of 210 ha in 1996. Over the years, the mana-
gement was strengthened through the involvement of
the local authorities, the ishers and permanent mem-
bers and results began to emerge with the colonisation
of reefs multiplying biomass by 5, increasing appeal to
tourists, and for ishers who came to set their nets on
the edge of the MPA. Starting out with small resources,
the MPA has gradually become a reference in the Me-
diterranean in thirty years.
Through this long-term partnership, the ishers have
come to work more closely with the scientists, the ad-
ministration and the local authorities; their organisa-
tions are strengthened by this, at least at local level,
and they learn to negotiate with partners such as the
Marseilles Port Authorities. In parallel to the intensii-
cation and increasing specialisation in ishing methods,
the techniques and know-how of these “craft trades”
and the wide variety of their catches which are sold di-
rect to the customer, are an integral part of a cultural
heritage which deserves to be recognised, promoted
and extended. These points are today entrenched in
the Park's management plan. 
Point for Create synergy between
consideration co-managed isheries and marine
n° 13 protected areas
■ Create institutional linkages to establish a national
integrating framework, identify a leading institution,
jointly deine and develop co-management plans;
■ Harmonise the legal, institutional and administra-
tive framework; 
■ Coordinate the development of the co-management
of a ishery and of an MPA by simplifying the arrange-
ments;
■ Boost the management of migratory resources and
develop transnational networks before decreeing
transboundary co-management of a ishery or an MPA;
■ Make sure it is appropriate to create an MPA to solve
a problem of ishing or related to a speciic resource,
rather than implementing straightforward spatial and
temporal restrictions; 
■ Regulate ishing capacity, including artisanal, prior
to creating an MPA, particularly when migratory spe-
cies are involved.
3.6.8 Applying co-management to artiicial
reefs and FADs
There are four main categories of artiicial reef associa-
ted with the various present day goals (ishing and pro-
ductivity, recreation, restoration of the environment and
optimisation of coastal developments). Over the past few
years, the concept of “artiicial reef” has gradually been
replacing that of "artiicial habitat”. 
An analysis of artiicial reef management in the expe-
rience of Senegal (Bargny and Yenne) brings to light the
comparative advantages of a co-management system
(Mbaye et al, 2008). Artiicial reef co-management re-
quires joint decisions, particularly in terms of use alloca-
tion. It also requires adaptive co-management, which is
achieved through joint design and formulation, clear
goals, inancing of management, adaptable management
rules deined upstream, and control and surveillance of
rule enforcement. 
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☞ The review of regional experiences in terms of the installation and management of FADs or artiicial reefs indicates that:
■ They should be part of integrated coastal management and sustainable isheries management incorporating control
of ishing effort and pressure;
■ Their co-management presents the same conditionality and phases as an MPA, with an additional concern related
to end of life and renewal of structural work (essential for FAD, sometimes necessary for artiicial reefs). 
Fish Aggregation Devices (FADs) differ signiicantly from
artiicial reefs since they are clearly deined not as tools
for increasing natural productivity or improving local bio-
diversity, but as actual ishing gear targeting small or
large pelagic ish. There are two major types of FAD, those
anchored in deep waters and loating, at considerable cost
(often used by large ocean seiners) and those anchored
in shallow waters or near the coast (even if sometimes in
deep waters), which are affordable to local or traditional
ishers in terms of maintenance and can be co-managed.
In the SRFC region, Cape Verde is emblematic of the ins-
tallation and management of FADs with the Maio and
Pedra Badejo projects.
Observation of FAD management reveals a number of
weaknesses (Rey-Valette et al. 2000) which can be ex-
plained by the following inadequacies: Irregular mainte-
nance and renewal of the FAD, poor transfer of
management to the professionals and lack of empower-
ment of the latter, poor integration or lack of institutional
change in response to technological changes, irregular
monitoring, and the absence of a legal framework.
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ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY
OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES
IN FISHERIES CO-MANAGEMENT 
Eleven detailed “experience sheets” were produced in the
“technical report” on co-managed isheries, each pertai-
ning to a different country, including examples from Eu-
rope, Asia, Africa and America (cf. map in section 1.3). All
the experts who produced an analysis of a co-manage-
ment experience have in-depth knowledge of the subject
and country concerned, enabling a detailed analysis while
at the same time following an identical model for each
example. 
The experiences analysed were selected according to se-
veral criteria, such as available hindsight on the process
implemented, the exemplary nature of the case in ques-
tion (Japanese co-management or the Mediterranean
prud’homies, for instance), the illustrative nature of the
scale of application of the co-management, whether local,
national or transnational, the degree of success, and,
lastly, the importance in terms of lessons that can be
drawn for the SRFC area.
The analysis of eleven experiences made it possible to
highlight the dificulties encountered, what worked well
in the design and formulation or implementation, how the
players found ways to adapt the sharing of responsibili-
ties depending on how the situation and power relations
were evolving and on the progress of the projects.
The Japanese experience conirms two conditions for suc-
cess: (i) effective decentralisation at sector level, and (ii)
the necessary building of community-based management.
It also underscores the role of the State in creating a legal
framework conducive to co-management and an institu-
tional framework conducive to effective decentralisation,
with the creation of multiple-scale organisations for coor-
dinating the development of marine isheries. Lastly, it
emphasises the importance of the structuring of commu-
nity-based management around the territorial use rights
granted by the legislator, and the possibility of a co-ma-
nagement system changing scale, from ishery to ecosys-
tem, for instance.
Thailand's experience shows the necessary adaptation of
co-management methods to the institutional framework
of the country concerned, to the constraints and needs of
the community concerned. It underlines the necessary re-
vision of the legislative arsenal in order to recognise and
afirm the isheries co-management; the necessary clari-
ication and deinition of ishing rights on the scale of the
community; the advantages of involving ishers in the col-
lection and processing of data in collaboration with the
scientists; the advantage of targeting achievable goals to
obtain swift results and create an awareness of the bene-
its of commitment and effort.
☞ Eleven “experience sheets” were analysed in depth and are presented: 
■ Sheet no. 1. An example of co-management institutionalised on a national scale: coastal isheries in Japan.
■ Sheet no. 2. A gradual adaptation of the co-management framework for artisanal isheries: the example of the Thai
isheries
■ Sheet no. 3. The concerted action of setting up a co-management process: The example of co-managed isheries in the
province of Aceh (Indonesia). 
■ Sheet no. 4. From legalisation to the legitimisation of co-management: The example of lake isheries in Burkina Faso. 
■ Sheet no. 5. The co-management of local isheries and protection of a stock – Rio Grande de Buba (Guinea Bissau).
■ Sheet no. 6. The dificulties of co-management: The example of artisanal isheries in Senegal.
■ Sheet no. 7. Fisheries co-management and management plan implementation process. The example of the “Octopus
Plan” (Mauritania).
■ Sheet no. 8. Transboundary management of shared stocks of hake in the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem.
■ Sheet no. 9. Decentralized co-management withstands time and institutional change - the Prud’homies de pêche in
the French Mediterranean 
■ Sheet no. 10. The development of co-managed artisanal-industrial isheries: The example of mixed development zones
(ZAC) in shrimp isheries (Madagascar)
■ Sheet no. 11. Fisheries co-management and surveillance/control of ishing activities (Canada and Benin)
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The isheries co-management experience in Aceh pro-
vince, Indonesia draws attention to the importance of ne-
gotiation and of four of its components; awareness
raising, capacity building, action on the ground and net-
working. It conirms the necessity of explicit sharing of
responsibilities among the stakeholders, and of the
players in the co-management assuming ownership of the
different phases. The example stresses the necessity of
adapting co-management arrangements as the situation
and needs evolve, but also of placing isheries co-mana-
gement in the broader context of the ecosystem and the
local economy.
The experience of Burkina Faso bring to light the neces-
sity of an adaptable legal co-management framework in
the form of laws, decrees, orders and speciications do-
cuments; the necessity for completed institutionalisation
with recognised centrality and a detailed remit for the
management committees; the achieving of the goal of le-
gitimisation integrating the oral tradition and custom,
beyond the simple legalisation of co-management; the ad-
vantages of restricting the co-management unit since this
restriction favours legitimisation by the stakeholders.
The experience of Guinea Bissau in the co-management
of Rio Grande de Buba isheries reveals: The advantages
of leadership for formulating a management plan; the im-
portance of local facilitators and the involvement of asso-
ciations in surveillance; lastly, the possibility of replicating
the experience on condition that the ecosystem and i-
shing community are comparable. It also shows how it is
easier to set up co-management in a small, circumscribed
territory and how co-management can be used to deine
rules for restricting territorial use.
The experience of Senegal conirms that donor support
must be continuous, in order to consolidate pilot expe-
riences, since throughout the projects we ind a focus on
certain sites; that the support of the population is evident
in the sites where the co-management was set up with
substantial and continuous means; that organising the co-
management players in occupational groups or by terri-
tory may gain the support of the population concerned.
The dificulties of the Senegalese experience led to the
proposal of a series of recommendations including: Har-
monise the legislation governing ishing with that of de-
centralisation; formulate a co-management strategy
document; deine the application criteria and mecha-
nisms and clarify the interactions between them to ligh-
ten the administrative procedures; formulate a suitable
communication policy oriented towards all the players
concerned and the territorial administrations; enable the
co-management body (in Senegal, the Local artisanal i-
sheries committees) to collect taxes and contributions.
The experience of the octopus management plan in Mau-
ritania shows how initial objectives can be insuficiently
appropriate and how the different institutions are mobi-
lised to a greater or lesser degree. This example above all
shows how, in the implementation of a management plan,
the institutional function (deinition of the legal and ins-
titutional frameworks, deinition and distribution of roles,
assuming of responsibility and policy orientations, and
allocation of inancial resources) is important and makes
or breaks the implementation of binding measures. It also
shows the importance of synergies between the different
institutions.
The experience of cooperative transboundary co-mana-
gement of shared stocks of hake in the Benguela Current
Large Marine Ecosystem shows the advantages of signing
a Fisheries Protocol explicitly binding on all the States
concerned; and progressive implementation of co-mana-
gement with respect to the dificulties to be smoothed
over (diversity of institutions and management methods,
the absence of real regional procedures for managing
transboundary stocks).
The experience of the prud’homies in the French Medi-
terranean highlights how ishers were able to maintain
links with the preservation of the quality of the ishing
grounds and sustain a small, diversiied ishery and the
oral transmission of the traditional prud'homies culture.
The prud’homies enabled the integration of immigrant i-
shers from a variety of backgrounds, a certain degree of
involvement in coastal management and the life of the
community, the initiation of actions such as the creation of
reserves, structuring (prud’homie collectives, prud’homie
members elected to the isheries committees) and reco-
gnition from the local authorities. Lastly, they enabled
good practices to be maintained in terms of local co-ma-
nagement and surveillance arrangements. This example
shows how, over the years, a decentralized co-manage-
ment organisation can deal with different political in-
luences, cultural change and technological advances. It
brings to light the foundations on which decisions, pro-
cesses, dificulties and successes are based to maintain
the system in a context of a reduction in the numbers of i-
shing jobs and institutional change.
Madagascar's experience of mixed development zones
combining artisan ishers and industrial ishers around
shrimp resources places emphasis on the setting up of
consultation bodies and methods; the formulation of “de-
velopment contracts” authorising validation at the level
of the regional, then national, bodies, within which the
competent administration is represented; lastly the reali-
sation of concrete action likely to contribute in the short
or medium term to a better management of the resource,
39
the consolidation of consultation, and the sustainable de-
velopment of the pilot zones. This example stresses the
timing dificulties involved in short-term projects asso-
ciated with the implementation of long-term processes.
It also shows an example of an approach in a context of
co-management of artisanal and industrial ishing of the
same resource. This example speciies the importance of
step-by-step support enabling collective learning through
the implementation of decentralised co-management bo-
dies. It also shows the advantages of creating a co-mana-
gement area with boundaries that favour the anchorage of
the stakeholders in a perimeter that is easily identiiable
by all.
The Canadian experience of co-management of surveil-
lance and control shows the importance of having a legal
framework prior to the introduction of new co-manage-
ment methods associated with industrial ishing. It also
shows an innovative surveillance funding mechanism by
the ishers in support of State surveillance actions and the
factors leading to the maintaining or weakening of the
mechanism.
The experience of Benin in isheries surveillance speciies
the limits and the importance of mobilising the players in
programmes to combat illegal ishing and the overexploi-
tation of the resources to make up for the weakness of
State-run surveillance programmes. It highlights the pre-
cautions to be taken and the recommendations for im-
plementing co-management that involves ishers in
surveillance.
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